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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a second appeal regarding Kerry Thomas' motion to withdraw guilty plea. 
In the prior appeal, the Court of Appeals vacated the district court's denial of the motion 
to withdraw guilty plea and remanded the matter for a hearing. At that hearing, the 
district court again denied the motion to withdraw guilty plea. 
Mr. Thomas appeals once more, asserting the district court erred by holding that 
his plea was knowingly, voluntarily or intelligently made even though the record showed 
he was not advised of a direct consequences of his plea (and awareness cannot be 
fairly inferred) to wit, that his sentence could run consecutively to the sentence he was 
currently serving (and it was). 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The background of this case is aptly explained in the unpublished opinion from 
the prior appeal, State v. Thomas, docket no. 36947, (unpublished 3/3/2011): 
Thomas was arrested and charged with seven counts of transfer of body 
fluid which may contain HIV, Idaho Code section 39-608. At the time, 
Thomas was on parole for a 1997 conviction of this same crime, and when 
the allegations in this case were revealed, his parole was revoked and he 
was ordered to serve the remainder of his sentence. The state agreed that 
it would drop five of the alleged counts in return for Thomas pleading guilty 
to two counts. There was no agreement on sentencing. During the plea 
colloquy, the court stated: 
Mr. Thomas, it is my understanding that you are going to be 
pleading guilty this morning to two counts of intentionally 
transferring the HIV virus and that you understand that each of 
those could expose you to a sentence of up to 15 years in prison 
and a fine up to $5,000, or both; and that because sentences can 
be imposed consecutively in Idaho, you are at risk for imprisonment 
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for up to 30 years, fines of up to $10,000, or both, and restitution 
should that be appropriate to any victim in this case. Is that correct? 
(Emphasis added.) Thomas answered that he understood. The court 
continued with the plea colloquy and accepted Thomas's plea. At 
sentencing, the court imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years with ten 
years determinate for each of the two counts to be served consecutively. 
The sentence was also ordered to run consecutive to the remainder of the 
current sentence - approximately three (3) years - Thomas was serving 
on the 1997 conviction. 
Thomas filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea and requested a hearing on the matter. The court denied defendant's 
request for hearing, without prejudice, but granted him leave to file a 
supporting brief, detailing the factual and legal basis for his motion. In the 
event Thomas could make a prima facie showing of manifest injustice, the 
court stated it would then grant a hearing on the motion. Six months later, 
Thomas filed a "renewed motion" with supporting memorandum to 
withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds he was not advised that he could 
receive a consecutive sentence. By memorandum decision and order, the 
court summarily denied Thomas's motion because it found that Thomas 
was specifically advised that consecutive sentences could be imposed. 
Thomas appeals. 
Id., slip op. p. 1-2. 
As further explained in the unpublished opinion, the renewed motion to 
withdraw guilty plea claimed Mr. Thomas was not advised he could receive a 
consecutive sentence and the change of plea transcript was attached thereto. However, 
Mr. Thomas failed to crystallize his argument, that the complained of failure of the 
district court was to advise that his new sentence could run consecutive to the sentence 
he was currently serving, as opposed to a failure to advise that the sentences on the 
two counts to which he pled guilty could run consecutive to each other. Since Mr. 
Thomas was clearly advised of the latter, the district court found the motion to withdraw 
guilty plea to be without merit. Id. p. 5. 
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The unpublished opinion continued by stating that given the poor drafting of the 
motion to withdraw guilty plea and memorandum in support, the district court's ruling 
was understandable. While the issue was raised barely enough to be considered on 
appeal, the district court did not recognize or rule on Appellant's actual argument, nor 
was the state given an opportunity to present its case below. Id. p. 5-6. 
The unpublished opinion held as follows: 
The issue would be more appropriately before this Court after the parties 
have fully argued the matter to the district court, and that court reaches a 
decision on whether the record, and reasonable inferences to be drawn 
therefrom, including Thomas's extensive involvement in the criminal 
justice system, demonstrates he was or was not aware of the 
consequence that his sentences could run consecutive to his prior 
sentence. See Huffman, 137 Idaho at 888, 55 P.3d at 881. Considering 
that the district court's initial order stated it would grant a hearing on the 
matter if a prima facie showing of manifest injustice was alleged, had the 
issue been more clearly framed, a hearing would likely have been granted. 
This Court, therefore, will remand the case for a hearing on Thomas's 
motion and resolution by the district court . .f 
Id. p. 6. 
FOOTNOTES 
2 The parties and/or court could potentially consider concurrent service 
with the prior three-year sentence at the hearing. On appeal, while not 
identifying it as his preferred alternative, Thomas did acknowledge that 
if he had received concurrent treatment with the prior sentence then 
there would be no prejudice, i.e. no manifest injustice, and his claim 
would be rendered moot. 
The unpublished opinion then vacated the order denying the motion to withdraw 
guilty plea and remanded the matter to the district court for a hearing on the claim that 
Mr. Thomas was not advised or aware that his sentence could run consecutive to a prior 
sentence he was serving. Id. p. 6. 
Upon remand, the matter was briefed by the parties. The state also filed a Rule 
35 motion which requested the court run the instant sentences concurrent to the prior 
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sentence to eliminate any prejudice and then the court could deny the motion to 
withdraw guilty plea. (R. p. 76-77, 78-81.) 
At the hearing, the court denied the motion to withdraw guilty plea. It then 
granted the state's Rule 35 motion and amended the judgment to provide that the 
sentences run concurrent to the prior sentence. (R. p. 93.) 
Appellant timely appeals. (R. p. 98.) 
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ISSUE 
Whether the district court erred by denying Mr. Thomas' motion to withdraw 
guilty plea as not voluntarily, knowingly or intelligently made because he was not 
advised of all of its direct consequences, to wit, that he could receive a 
sentence which would run consecutive to the one he was currently serving. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY DENYING MR. THOMAS' MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA AS NOT VOLUNTARILY, KNOWINGLY OR 
INTELLIGENTLY MADE BECAUSE HE WAS NOT ADVISED OF ALL OF ITS DIRECT 
CONSEQUENCES, TO WIT, THAT HE COULD RECEIVE A SENTENCE WHICH 
WOULD RUN CONSECUTIVE TO THE ONE HE WAS CURRENTLY SERVING 
A. Standard of review 
Whether to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea lies in the discretion of the 
district court and such discretion should be liberally applied. State v. Freeman, 110 
Idaho 117,121,714 P.2d 86, 90 (Ct. App. 1986). Appellate review of the denial of a 
motion to withdraw a plea is limited to determining whether the district court exercised 
sound judicial discretion as distinguished from arbitrary action. Id. 
B. The arguments and court's ruling after the remand. 
After remand, Mr. Thomas filed a memorandum in support of his motion to 
withdraw guilty plea clearly arguing that the issue was he was not advised the new 
sentence could run consecutively to the prior sentence he was currently serving. (R. p. 
71-74.) 
Significantly, the state filed a motion to correct sentencing pursuant to I.C.R. 35. 
(R. p. 76.) In that motion, the state explained as follows: 
In this case the State and counsel for the defendant arrived at a mutually 
agreeable negotiation that consisted of the defendant pleading guilty to 
two of the seven counts contained in the Indictment with the sentences 
running consecutive to each other (Transcript of Guilty Plea). The State, 
however, did not place a last condition (consecutive to the parole violation) 
on the record at the time of Thomas' guilty plea. The defendant was 
sentenced on June 24 2009. The court ordered the defendant to serve 
fixed time consecutive to his parole violation. 
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The defendant appealed his conviction stating that he was not told by the 
Court that his sentence could run consecutive to his parole violation. The 
record supports Thomas argument. The State respectfully requests 
pursuant to ICR 35 that Thomas' sentence be corrected in the manner 
consistent with the negotiated plea agreement that was placed on the 
record at the time that Thomas pled guilty to two counts of Knowingly 
Transfer of the HIV Virus. The record clearly indicates that Thomas could 
face a maximum sentence of up to fifteen years on each Count that could 
run consecutive to each other. In this case, the defendant received fifteen 
years on each count with ten years fixed, with each running consecutive 
for a total of thirty years with Twenty years fixed. Additionally the State 
requests that the time he was ordered to serve run concurrent to the 
parole violation that Thomas was ordered to serve by the Idaho Parole 
Commission in a separate hearing. 
LC.R. 35 motion (emphasis added). (R. p. 76-77.) 
The state then filed a brief objecting to the motion to withdraw guilty plea. (R. p. 
78.) In it, the state again conceded Mr. Thomas was not told in Court that his 
sentences could run consecutive to his parole violation. (R. p. 79.) However, the state 
went on to argue that this does not amount to manifest injustice. (R. p. 80.) Since 
except for the conceded failure, the plea was otherwise knowing, voluntary and 
intelligent, the state argued that it would be draconian and manifestly unjust to the state 
and the victim to allow Mr. Thomas to withdraw his guilty plea. (R. p. 79-80.) Therefore, 
the state requested that the motion to withdraw guilty plea be denied and instead the 
court correct the sentence by running the instant sentence concurrent with the time he 
was ordered to serve on the parole violation so that Mr. Thomas would suffer no 
prejudice. (R. p. 80-81.) 
The defendant filed a supplemental memorandum which pointed out that the 
record is the only source from which to infer facts regarding whether the guilty plea was 
knowing, voluntary and intelligent. (R. p. 83.) The memorandum continued by arguing 
that since the state conceded that the record supports Mr. Thomas' argument that he 
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was not told by the court that his sentence could run consecutive to his parole violation, 
the state has essentially stipulated that the record does not establish that the plea was 
entered knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. (R. p. 83.) Thus, the only question is 
whether there was manifest injustice. 
The memorandum continued by arguing that manifest injustice and prejudice are 
not equivalent. (R. p. 83.) Based on State v. Huffman, 137 Idaho 886 (Ct.App. 2002), if 
a guilty plea is was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, a defendant must be 
permitted to withdraw it. (R. p. 84.) As summarized by the memorandum, the parties 
agree that the record is inadequate to establish that the guilty plea was entered with 
knowledge of its direct consequences, the caselaw is clear this results in manifest 
injustice, and the caselaw establishes that under those facts there is no discretion to 
deny the motion to withdrawn guilty plea, so therefore, the defendant must be permitted 
to withdraw his guilty plea. (R. p. 85.) 
The state filed a reply brief which reiterated its earlier filings. (R. p. 87-90.) 
At the hearing on the motion to withdraw guilty plea, the parties maintained their 
respective positions. The court began by mentioning that while the court may not have 
specifically advised Mr. Thomas of the possibility that this sentence may run 
consecutive to the prior sentence, the record does not necessarily establish that he was 
without awareness of the consequence. (Tr. p. 11-12.) The court referenced various 
parts of the change of plea hearing, including the recess requested by defense counsel 
for additional time to meet with his client to discuss the plea bargain. Also referenced 
were later representations by defense counsel (later affirmed by Mr. Thomas) that he 
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had adequate time to fully discuss the case and all of its ramifications with the client, 
and that he had discussed the possible consequences. (Tr. p. 12-14.) 
Counsel for Petitioner argued that there is nothing in the record that explains 
what defense counsel actually told Mr. Thomas and so a ruling that he told him that the 
sentence could run consecutive would be based on a guess. (Tr. p. 13-14.) Regarding 
the recess to further discuss the plea, counsel argued that in his experience where a 
client is looking at 30 years, the private session (during the recess) would be to try and 
convince the client to plead guilty, and that it would be mere speculation that the 
defense attorney was discussing the consecutive nature of the parole violation. (Tr. p. 
15-16.) 
The court disagreed, explaining that there is a difference between speculation 
and inference, and that its ruling would be based on the representation of an attorney 
who has been a longtime and long serving public defender who was aware of all of 
these factors. (Tr. p. 14, 16.) 
In its ruling, the court began by explaining that it had asked the defendant if he 
was currently on probation or parole, to which he responded that he was not any longer 
because his parole had been revoked the week prior. The court explained that it would 
normally at that point go on to advise the defendant that the sentence could be imposed 
[consecutively] and that he could be punished for the violation separately. The court 
conceded that it did not do so here and the only reason it can recall why it didn't is that 
Mr. Thomas was already being punished for the violation. The court stated it would not 
fail to follow up again and had already amended its plea colloquy. (Tr. p. 26-27.) 
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The court then explained the legal history which resulted in the current 
requirements for plea colloquies and then complained about the requirements the 
appellate court's imposed on the trial courts. (Tr. p. 27-36.) 
The court went on to explain that the record shows that counsel represented to 
the court that he advised his client of the consequences of the plea and Mr. Thomas 
confirmed it, and that is the only way that the court can check because it can only ask 
general questions so as to not invade the attorney client relationship. (Tr. p. 37.) 
And now it is being argued that even a general question asked of counsel 
and asked of the defendant if they understand their consequences, the 
consequences of their plea and the potential punishments, it is insufficient. 
At the beginning of every arraignment this Court asks every defendant, 
"Do you read write, and understand the English language?" To that 
question Mr. Thomas answered yes. If Mr. Thomas understands the 
English language and his counsel explained to him the consequences of 
his plea, he entered a knowing guilty plea in this case. 
Not only that, he entered his plea voluntarily, being fully aware of the fact 
that could receive up to 30 years in prison just on these charges. And he 
already knew that he could be separately punished for the violation of his 
parole because he had already been returned to the Idaho State 
Penitentiary for those violations. So not only was he aware of it, he was 
actually serving that time at the penitentiary when he entered his plea. 
In the face of all of those facts, this Court finds that the defendant entered 
a knowing, voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty in this case. The Court 
will not allow Mr. Thomas to withdraw that guilty plea. 
The Court will, however, because I pay attention to the footnotes from the 
Court of Appeals, the Court will, however, take into account what I believe 
to be a strong suggestion from the Court of Appeals that to cure any 
potential problem and remove any potential prejudice, that the three-year 
consecutive sentence with regard to that these sentences will be 
consecutive to one another but not to his already imposed sentence, to 
remove any potential for any prejudice caused by this matter. The Court 
will grant the State's request to reduce or to change the language of the 
judgment in accordance with the strong suggestion of the Court of 
Appeals as placed in their footnote so that it is clear that these two 
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sentences, while consecutive to one another, are not consecutive to the 
parole violation. 
Tr. p. 37, In. 15-p. 39, In. 10. 
C. The district court erred by denying the motion to withdraw guilty plea. 
The law relevant to this case is well established and was also discussed by the 
parties below and the Court of Appeals in the prior appeal. In Idaho, in order for a guilty 
plea to be valid, the defendant must be advised of the possibility that his sentence may 
run consecutively to a prior sentence, as explained by the Idaho Court of Appeals in 
State v. Huffman, 137 Idaho 886 (Ct.App. 2002): 
Thus, the first question presented by this appeal is whether the possibility 
that the defendant's sentence will be made to run consecutively to a prior 
sentence is a direct consequence of which the defendant must be 
informed in order to ensure that a guilty plea is voluntary, knowing, and 
intelligent. This question was answered in the affirmative by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in State v. Flummer, 99 Idaho 567, 585 P.2d 1278 (1978), 
where the Court held that the possibility that a sentence will run 
consecutively is a potential consequence of a guilty plea that must be 
disclosed to the defendant. Id. at 568, 585 P.2d at 1279. Therefore, if a 
consecutive sentence has been imposed upon a defendant who pleaded 
guilty without awareness of this possible consequence, withdrawal of the 
plea must be allowed. 
Id. at p. 887-888 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). 
More recently, in State v. Shook, 144 Idaho 858, 172 P.3d 1133 (Ct.App. 
2007), the Court of Appeals reiterated as follows: 
It is established in Idaho law that the possibility that a sentence will be 
made to run consecutive to a prior sentence is a direct consequence of a 
guilty plea, of which the defendant must be informed in order to ensure 
that the plea is voluntary, knowing and intelligent. See State v. Flummer, 
99 Idaho 567, 585 P.2d 1278 (1978); Huffman, 137 Idaho at 887-88, 55 
P.3d at 880-81. 
Id., 144 Idaho at p. 859 (footnote omitted.) 
13 
Even the state and court conceded in this case that the record showed that Mr. 
Thomas was not advised by the court that his sentence could run consecutively to the 
one he was already serving. Thus, the only issue is whether Mr. Thomas's awareness 
of the direct consequence can be inferred from the record. 
Appellant asserts that it cannot and the district court erred when finding 
otherwise. The court relies heavily of the public defender's affirmation that he had fully 
explained the consequences of the guilty plea to Mr. Thomas, which was affirmed by 
Mr. Thomas. First of all, Mr. Thomas is not in the position to know whether his public 
defender had told him all the consequences or not since he would not know all the 
consequences, at best he can affirm that he was told of some consequences. 
As to the public defender's representation that he had fully advised Mr. Thomas 
of the consequences, without any detail as to what was said, this does not establish that 
the consequence at issue here was discussed. There are many, many consequences 
to a plea of guilty to a felony charge, ranging from imprisonment to social distain. 
Obviously, an attorney does not really advise a defendant of every possible ramification 
of a guilty plea, but is supposed to advise the defendant of the direct consequences. 
However, what are considered to be direct consequences is an often litigated and 
changing area of law, for instance, immigration consequences must now be included. 
Thus, the attorney simply stating he advised the client of all of the consequences 
does not tell us what those specific consequences were and whether they included the 
one currently at issue. While the court complained that it cannot more specifically ask 
because it would invade the attorney-client privilege, for this very reason, it is the court 
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which should be advising the defendant the defendant on the record so his knowledge 
can be conclusively established, rather than speculating about what the attorney said. 
Also related to the attorney, the court relies on its personal knowledge of the 
specific public defender involved in this case. But basing a finding of what advice was 
probably given on the court's personal knowledge of a specific attorney results in a 
standard less and unreviewable ruling which defies the very requirement that the record 
establish the defendant's knowledge. 
The court also claims that the fact that Mr. Thomas was aware he was currently 
serving the original sentence somehow means he was aware that his new sentence 
could run consecutively to it. However, the court never explains why this would be so, 
and such an inference is in direct contravention of Shook, supra. There, at the time of 
sentencing on the new charge the defendant was also in prison on the original 
sentence (and the new crime was actually aggravated battery against another inmate at 
the prison). However, the fact that he was in prison serving his original sentence did 
not give rise to any inference that his new sentence could run consecutive to it. 
Finally, while the court did not specifically utilize this point in its ruling, at the 
hearing it questioned how Mr. Thomas could be prejudiced by any failure to advise him 
since when arraigned he was told he was subject to up to 105 years in prison (or life 
for the persistent violator). (Tr. p. 20-21.) Of course (and as counsel argued at the 
hearing), that was only the maximum penalty for the charged counts, not the 
consequences of the guilty plea where most of the charges were dismissed so he was 
no longer subject to those penalties. (Tr. p. 21.) 
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In fact, at the change of plea hearing the district court did the math and provided 
Mr. Thomas with a concrete maximum number of years that he was facing, to wit, 30. 
This is significant, since any inference from the record that knew he could actually serve 
some 33 years is contrary to what he was directly told, which he was "at risk for 
imprisonment for up to 30 years." 
Likewise, additional statements by the court are also inconsistent with an 
inference that Mr. Thomas was aware his sentence could run consecutive to the one he 
was currently serving. At the change of plea hearing, the court inquired into whether 
Mr. Thomas was presently on probation or parole, to which he answered not as of last 
week because his parole was revoked. But as the court admitted, it did not then explain 
to Mr. Thomas that his sentence could run consecutively to that other sentence he was 
then serving. 
The conspicuous absence of this advice would itself lead Mr. Thomas to believe 
that this was not a possibility. This is particularly true given the other sort of 
consequences of which Mr. Thomas was advised, such as the loss of right to vote and 
that felonies on his record can lead to persistent violator charges and increased 
penalties in the future. (R. p. 18.) 
Therefore, even if there was some reasonable inference that the attorney, rather 
than the court, advised Mr. Thomas that his sentence could run consecutive, the court's 
own advice and statements were inconsistent with that position, and so the record of 
the entire proceedings still does not establish that Mr. Thomas' understood that direct 
consequence. 
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To summarize, Appellant asserts that his plea and the resultant waiver of 
constitutional rights were invalid because it was not taken in accordance with 
constitutional due process standards under the 5th and 14th Amendments to the United 
States Constitution. That is, the guilty plea was not made voluntarily, knowingly and 
intelligently because he was not advised before entry of the plea of a direct 
consequence, that his sentence in the new case could run consecutive to an existing 
sentence. Nor can his awareness of this direct consequence be inferred from the 
record 
Under well established Idaho caselaw, since the guilty plea was not made 
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently, manifest injustice is established and the 
defendant must be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. Huffman, supra. Therefore, the 
district court erred when it denied the motion to withdraw guilty plea.1 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Thomas respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order of the district 
court denying his motion to withdraw guilty plea. 
~ 
DATED this l day of August, 2012. 
1 As argued by counsel in the hearing, even if a defendant cannot bring a motion to 
withdraw guilty plea if the consequence he was not informed of was not actually 
imposed, this is different than avoiding the withdrawal of an invalid plea by simply 
removing that consequence since Idaho law clearly provides that withdrawal must be 
allowed. (Tr. p. 20.) 
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